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NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
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FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court resolved a
critical dispute regarding the interpretation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”)1 and its notice requirement. In Safeco
Insurance Co. of America v. Burr,2 the Court settled the definition of
“willful” violation—a determination that will have enormous effects
for insurance companies. Specifically, the Court held that willfulness
not only includes knowing violations, but also includes a violation
committed in reckless disregard of statutory obligations. Although
both of the insurance companies in Burr were technically victorious—
both were held not to have willfully violated the FCRA—the Court’s
interpretation of willfulness is more consumer-friendly. Still, Burr
may have left the door open for insurance companies to avoid the
notice requirement of the FCRA.
II. FACTS
Burr is a consolidated action involving two insurance companies,
GEICO General Insurance Company (“GEICO”) and Safeco
Insurance Company of America (“Safeco”).3

*
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2008 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (2006).
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007).
Id. at 2205.
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Both cases involve interpretations of the FCRA. The relevant
portion of the FCRA requires notice to a consumer subjected to
“adverse action . . . based in whole or in part on any information
4
contained in a consumer [credit] report.” The notice must, among
other things, inform the consumer of the adverse action.5 In terms of
insurance companies, an “adverse action” is “a denial or cancellation
of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other adverse or
unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of, any
insurance, existing or applied for.”6 Furthermore, anyone who
“willfully fails” to provide notice under these provisions of the FCRA
7
is liable to the consumer for actual, statutory and punitive damages.
In the first of the consolidated cases, GEICO used an applicant’s
credit score as part of a variety of information to select the
appropriate subsidiary insurance company, and the particular rate at
which a policy was to be issued.8 GEICO’s policy was to compare a
given applicant’s company and credit rate tier placement with the
company and tier placement that would have been assigned if it had
been calculated without reliance on credit history.9 In such cases, the
applicant is provided only with an adverse-action notice if the
“neutral” approach would have afforded them a lower priced tier or
company. Respondent, Edo, had his credit score considered when his
10
policy was issued. However, because a neutral score would not have
changed his company or tier, no adverse-action notice was sent to the
applicant.11
In the second of the two consolidated cases, Safeco similarly
utilized credit reports when determining initial insurance premiums.12
Here, Respondents Burr and Massey were offered higher rates than
13
the best possible rate because of their credit scores. As with the first
case, the applicants did not receive adverse-action notices.14
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15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a).
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i).
15 U.S.C. § 1681(n)(a).
Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2206.
Id. at 2206–07.
Id. at 2207.
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In both cases, the applicants initially brought suit, seeking
statutory and punitive damages and claiming that the insurance
companies were in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) by willfully
15
failing to provide notice of an adverse action. The district court in
the first case granted summary judgment in favor of GEICO, finding
that there is no adverse action when the premium charged would
have been the same regardless of whether the credit report
information had been considered.16 The district court granted Safeco
summary judgment as well, but on somewhat different grounds. The
lower court found that an initial rate for a new insurance policy
cannot be an “increase”—as required for an “adverse action”—
without prior dealings.17 In the absence of a previous rate, no
comparison exists, meaning that no increase is possible, and
consequently no adverse action occurred.18
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed both judgments. In
the case of GEICO, it held that if a consumer “would have received a
lower rate for his insurance had the information in his consumer
report been more favorable, an adverse action has been taken against
19
Because a better credit score could have assigned the
him.”
applicant to a more affordable company, notice was required.20 In
addition, the Ninth Circuit interpreted willfulness to include a
21
reckless disregard to comply with the FCRA. Similarly, the appeals
court reversed the district court in the action against Safeco, relying
on its reasoning in GEICO’s case that the notice requirement applies
to an initial dealing between the insurance company and an
applicant.22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two issues. The
first issue is whether willful failure under the FCRA includes a
violation committed in reckless disregard of the consumer’s rights.
Second, if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, then
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2004).
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Id. at 2206–07.
Edo v. GEICO Cas. Co., No. CV 02-678 BR, 2004 WL 3639689, at *4 (D. Or. Feb. 23,
Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2206.
Id.
Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 1099.
Spano v. Safeco Corp., 140 Fed. Appx. 746, 747 (9th Cir. 2005).
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the Court would proceed to determine whether GEICO and Safeco
committed reckless violations of the FCRA.
III. HOLDING AND REASONING
As to the first question, the Supreme Court held that willfulness
does in fact include a violation committed in reckless disregard of the
23
Although some confusion may have existed
notice obligation.
regarding whether recklessness is determined objectively or
subjectively, the Court held that reckless disregard is an objective
standard. The Court reasoned that there is a difference between the
use of the term “willfully” in the civil versus the criminal context.24
Accordingly, the common-law usage in civil cases treats violations in
reckless disregard as willful violations.25 Therefore, willfulness
includes action taken with “an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is
26
either known or so obvious that it should be known.”
The Court then addressed the issue of whether GEICO and
Safeco acted recklessly in violation of the FCRA. First, in considering
this issue, the court disagreed with the district court’s rationale in the
action against Safeco. The Supreme Court held that initial rates
27
charged for new insurance policies may constitute adverse actions.
A decrease, and thus an adverse action, does not require prior dealing
between the insurance company and the applicant. Finding no policy
rationale and no legislative history to support separate treatment of
first-time applicants, the Court determined that such applicants are
equally covered by the FCRA.28
Second, the Court held that for an adverse action to be “based . . .
on” a credit report, the credit report must be a necessary condition for
29
the difference in rates. Because “based . . . on” suggests but-for
causation, notice is only required if the applicant would have
30
benefitted had the credit report not been examined. In other words,
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Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2209.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2215.
Id. at 2210–11.
Id.
Id. at 2212.
Id.
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the use of a credit score must have been disadvantageous to the
31
applicant.
Next, to calculate whether the applicant has been disadvantaged,
the issue becomes to which baseline rate the actual rate received
should be compared. The Government and respondents argued that
the applicant should be entitled to notice anytime his credit score was
used as long as he would have received a better rate with the highest
32
possible credit score. The Court disagreed. Instead, it determined
that the crucial inquiry is whether the applicant actually suffered from
33
the use of his credit score. To determine this, the applicant’s actual
rate should be compared to the rate he would have received if his
credit score had not been used.34 If the actual rate is not higher than
this baseline rate, then the applicant has not been harmed by the use
of the credit report.35
After establishing the legal standards, the Court addressed the two
claims at hand. In the action against GEICO, it determined that
GEICO was under no obligation to provide adverse-action notice
when the applicant received the same initial rate that he would have
36
received had his credit report not been considered. Consequently, in
the absence of a duty to provide notice, GEICO was not in violation
of the FCRA.37 Safeco, on the other hand, was in a different position.
Because Safeco’s use of the credit report may have led to different
rates for the applicants, Safeco may have violated the FCRA by
failing to give notice to the applicants. However, the insurance
company did not act with the requisite recklessness. According to the
Court, the common-law standard for recklessness requires “an
unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that
it should be known.”38 Because Safeco’s interpretation of the
FCRA—reading that there cannot be an “increase” in the charges
upon the first interaction with the applicant—was not unreasonable, it
“falls well short of raising the ‘unjustifiably high risk’ of violating the
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Id.
Id. at 2213.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2214.
Id. at 2215–16.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).
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statute necessary for reckless liability.”
liable for statutory or punitive damages.
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Therefore, Safeco was not

IV. IMPACT
Although both insurance companies avoided liability under the
FCRA, the Supreme Court’s decision in Burr reveals that consumers
may have been victorious on several key issues. That being said, the
Court seems to have drawn the roadmap for compliance with the
FCRA notice requirement.
The Court made two key determinations that will make life more
difficult for insurance companies going forward. First, the Court
chose to adopt a more consumer-friendly standard for recovery than
the insurance companies sought. GEICO and Safeco argued that the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation was inconsistent with other federal
appellate court decisions that held a violation of the FCRA requires
that the insurance entity act with the understanding that its actions
40
are not permitted. However, by agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation that includes recklessness within the definition of
willfulness, the Court adopted a consumer-friendly interpretation.
This distinction is crucial. Under the Court’s holding, an insurance
company is acting recklessly if its interpretation of the statute was
highly unreasonable, and it should have known of the
unreasonableness, even if the company subjectively believed that it
was acting legally and not violating the rights of its consumers. From
a practical view, consumers bringing suits will have an easier time
proving a violation because they will no longer have to find evidence
showing that the companies had knowledge of their risk of violating
the FCRA.
Second, the Court determined that the notice requirement for
adverse actions applies equally to first-time customers. The argument
of the insurance companies had literal merit. As mentioned above,
for a cognizable adverse action under the FCRA, the statute requires

39. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2205.
40. See, e.g., Wantz v. Experian Info. Solutions, 386 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2004) (“To act
willfully, a defendant must knowingly and intentionally violate the [FCRA], and it must also be
conscious that [its] act impinges on the rights of others.”); Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 370
(8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a willful violation is nothing less than the “knowing and intentional
commission of an act the defendant knows to violate the law”).
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an “increase” in the amount charged to the consumer. Again, the
companies argued that for an increase to exist, there must be at least
one prior quote to serve as a base of comparison. However, the Court
noted—and correctly so—that there was no policy reason for this
reading, and instead, “increase” simply requires that the rate is higher
than it would have otherwise been, an interpretation that applies
41
As with the interpretation of
equally to first-time customers.
willfulness, this reading is significant. Had the Court agreed with the
insurance companies, the notice obligation would leave an enormous
loophole in the FCRA’s notice requirement.
But, the remainder of the Court’s opinion appears to offer a safe
harbor for insurance companies. After setting forth a consumerfriendly standard for willfulness and broadening the base of
individuals covered by the FCRA, the Court moved to the question of
which baseline rate should be the standard of comparison for the
actual rate when determining whether there was an increase. The
Court determined that the proper comparison was what the applicant
would have been charged if the credit report had not been used, as
opposed to what the customer would have been charged if his credit
42
report was better.
This comparison leads to a curious result. Consider a company
with a policy similar to GEICO’s—that is, an insurance company that
offers applicants an average rate when it does not check the
applicant’s credit score. Thus, if an applicant’s credit score is
considered, anyone with an average or above average credit score
cannot by definition be harmed by the use of their credit report. This
is the case even if they could have received a much better rate with a
higher score.
Justice Stevens carries this point even further. What if it is the
policy of an insurance company not to deal with applicants when the
company does not check its credit report? The odd result that follows
is that an applicant is never harmed when the credit score is part of
the computation. Consequently, the insurance company is never
required to give notice.

41. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2210–11.
42. Id. at 2213.
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V. CONCLUSION
At first glance, Burr appears to be a clear cut victory for the
insurance companies. However, a deeper reading reveals that the
Court has ruled against insurers on several significant issues. Still,
while the ultimate result is unclear, it is quite possible that the Court
has left a loophole for insurance companies to avoid the adverseaction notice requirement of the FCRA altogether.

